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1 The gap between rhetoric and reality
The Mubarak era saw a growing disconnect
between reality and the regime’s seemingly
earnest political discourse, which was all about
empowering the youth and helping them achieve
their full potential. This disconnect was to have
serious repercussions due to the increase in the
number of young people as well as their ratio in
the country’s demographic make-up. The ratio of
young people in the 18–29 age group, totalling
19 million in August 2010, was 24.2 per cent of
the total population (CAPMAS 2011). The
disconnect between reality and rhetoric was due
to four factors: the declining interest of
President Mubarak in the young, especially in
the 2000s; the failure of the political leadership
to develop a national policy on youth; the
instability of the organisational structures
supporting youth affairs; and the inadequacies of
the legislative framework governing the youth
movement in Egypt.
1.1 The decline of presidential interest in youth issues
In 1999, the Ministry of Youth was reintroduced
into the cabinet of Dr Atef Obeid, following an
absence that had lasted for the entire Mubarak
presidency. This was a good sign, for it suggested
a renewed interest in the welfare of young people.
Another good sign was the speech President
Mubarak made in the opening joint session of the
People’s Assembly and the Shura Council on
13 November 1999. In this speech, Mubarak
attributed the creation of a Ministry of Youth to
the growing interest in the ‘future of promising
generations which must have everything they
need to become part of the modern age in which
technological achievement depends on the
intellectual resources of the people’ (Ministry of
Youth 2003). This tone persisted in later speeches
made by President Mubarak in 2000, 2002, 2003
and 2004, when he spoke at length about the
importance of integrating the youth in decision-
making and involving them in party activities.
Public policy, the president said, must rid itself
from ‘bureaucratic regulations that stifle talent
and undermine honourable ambition’ (Mubarak
2002). According to the NDP programme for
2002, the president placed great hopes on ‘the
youths of Egypt who represent the largest
proportion of the Egyptian people’.
The president is also cited as having formed a
committee for youth inside the NDP Policies
Secretariat. The committee composed of
executives and experts interested in youth
affairs is said to have made valuable studies.
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Any optimism that this rhetoric generated was
short-lived. Soon, signs emerged of a declining
presidential interest in youth affairs. The first
sign was the decreased frequency of references to
youth issues in presidential speeches. The word
‘youth’ and its derivatives were mentioned twice
or less on average in the speeches the president
made at the joint sessions of the People’s Assembly
and the Shura Council in the period 2005–10 and
when mentioned, focused on old issues.
The second sign of reduced presidential interest
in youth issues has to do with the rare
appearances of the president in youth events in
the past ten years. In 2002, he even stopped
showing up for the annual meetings of university
youths, which he had attended regularly since
coming to power. He also failed to attend any
session of the four national conferences for
youths held between 2007 and 2010, although
these were organised under his aegis, and he
attended other events of equivalent importance,
including the National Conference for
Upgrading High School Education and the
National Conference on Population. The only
youth meeting Mubarak attended was with the
graduates of the National Project for the
Vocational Training of Youth, run by the Ministry
of Military Production, on 25 October 2005.
Likewise, Mubarak did not meet the NDP youths
nor did he hold a dialogue with them during his
entire presidency, aside from a meeting with
several NDP youths who spoke to him about
personal and career matters at the end of the 6th
NDP Annual Congress in September 2009.
The third sign is that the president hardly held
any meetings with any of the youth ministers1 in
the period 1999–2005, although the presidency
told the youth ministers in question more than
once to get prepared for such a meeting. Even
the one meeting the president held to discuss
youth policies on 8 October 2007 failed to
produce tangible results. The meeting came up
with guidelines, including instructions to
ministers to build a youth centre in every village
with a population of 5,000 or more; but none of
these were implemented, no allocations were
made, and no timetable was set.2
2 The failure of the political leadership to draw
up a national policy for youth
The ‘inner circle’ of the government and party elite
during the Mubarak years made little or no
headway on youth issues, even with the personal
interest of Gamal Mubarak, the president’s son, in
acquiring youth support for his political ambitions.
Successive governments failed to adopt a public
policy for youth or produce an authoritative
government paper on youth to match, for example,
the national policies on women and children. No
action was taken to emulate youth policies in other
Arab countries such as Jordan and Bahrain. This
happened despite the fact that the Ministry of
Youth and the Youth Committee of the NDP
Policies Secretariat saw the need to issue a national
policy for youth. They urged the formulation of a
practical framework delineating the official policy
on youth, spoke of enhancing coordination between
various players in the field of youth, and mentioned
that the ministries and competent departments
involved should turn the stated goals and strategies
into working plans and executive programmes.
The perception of youth problems by the NDP left
much to be desired, for although the NDP leaders
constantly boasted of the increased ratio of youths
in the 18–40 age group in the party, which stood at
49.4 per cent of the total membership in October
2008, the party’s interest in the youth was mostly
for propaganda purposes. In other words, the
party tried to overcome the ageing image of its
leadership and parliament members and to
appear with a youth face. This would seem to help
in mobilising support for the party potential
candidate in 2011 presidential elections.
In all general and annual conferences held by the
party in the period 2002–10; with the exception
of the 3rd General Congress of 2005, which
coincided with presidential elections, the Youth
Committee of the NDP Policies Secretariat made
a habit of issuing a special policy paper. But none
of the most credible policies that the committee
proposed were implemented by competent
government bodies.
The ruling party was aware of the need to
coordinate with the government concerning the
planning and implementation of youth policies,
and so established a special working group led by
NDP High Policy Secretary Gamal Mubarak, and
included Dr Ali Al Dean Hillal Dessouki,
member of the NDP Bureau and former youth
minister; the Minister of High Education; the
Minister of State for Scientific Research; the
head of the National Youth council; the
coordinator of student activities in Egyptian
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universities; the head of the Youth Committee in
the NDP Policies Secretariat; a member of the
National Youth Council; and the NDP youth
secretary. This committee met only twice: in
December 2010 and January 2011. Its memos
spoke of the shortage of funding allocated by the
government to youth activities and said that the
available money was thinly spread among too many
ministries and organisations (Hillal pers. comm.).3
2.1 The inadequacy of the legislative framework
regulating the youth movement
Under Mubarak, laws concerning the youth were
neglected by legislators. Not one law related to
the youth was passed during the entire Mubarak
era. Law 77 for 1975, concerning organisations
active in the field of youth and sports, of which
some provisions were modified in May 1975,
remained the only legislative framework
organising action concerning youths in Egypt
until 2011. Even this law, flawed as it was, was
only partially implemented. For instance, Section
8 of the said law, concerning the creation of a
general federation for youth organisations
engaged in voluntary work, was never
implemented. In July 2004, the Youth Minister
pushed for an amended form of this federation,
calling it ‘The Union of Voluntary Work for
Youth’.4 The union, which was supposed to
coordinate among various organisations working
in this field, never saw the light.
Most of the laws addressing youth affairs were
passed without taking the views of the youth into
account. Take for example the law on non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), No 84 for
2002, and its executive regulations, No 178 for
2002; the laws concerning the exercise of political
rights, which did not allow people under the age
of 30 to run for membership of legislative
councils; and the regulations and administrative
decisions related to the implementation of some
laws such as the student bylaw No 265 for 1979 –
none of these were issued in consultation with the
youth organisations: either because of the
inactivity of youth organisations at the time;
because of subsequent changes, as was the case
with the law on NGOs or because the political
environment was unfavourable, as was the case
with the student regulations.
As the discrepancy between reality and the
rhetoric persisted, both the government and the
party continued to speak about their interest in
energising the youth and embracing their ideas.
Subsequently, the youth felt alienated and
distrustful of the public policies. The youth were
also skeptical of the reforms the government was
pursuing in the political and economic spheres
(Shoaeb 2004) Their rejection of official policies
was often the result of the government’s
reluctance to address urgent problems. Among
the disadvantaged youths, resentment of the
wealthier and better educated classes who had
access to better jobs was widespread.
3 The policy failures in education, employment
and political engagement
Although government policies took considerable
interest in youth issues, decision-makers failed to
make budgetary allocations or introduce
executive plans to address youth-related
problems. There follows a review of the policies
of higher education, employment, political
engagement, and social integration in the last
ten years of Mubarak’s rule, as well as the
reaction of the youth thereof.
3.1 The education policy
Under Mubarak, government officials often spoke
of the need to restructure the entire system of
education. The final year of high school, the
evaluation methods, examinations, ennoblement
in universities, training for the labour market,
revision of technical education to make it
compatible with the requirements of business,
were all discussed. Officials also saw the need to
address 11 important challenges facing the entire
system, such as the need to provide adequate
guarantees for equal opportunity, to enhance the
quality of technical education, to change the
culture and societal opinion of college graduates,
to link the system of enrolment in higher
education with students’ aptitudes and the
requirements of the labour market, and to sort
out the question of funding, which is crucial to
educational reform (Mubarak 2008).
The vision was there, so was the recognition of the
importance of the issues at hand. But the policies
often failed to come into action. Some faced real
difficulties in implementation due to the low
spending on education. As a ratio of the GDP,
spending on education remained particularly low
during the period 2004/05–2008/09. The ratio was
4.8 per cent in 2004/05; 4.2 per cent in 2005/06;
4.1 per cent in 2006/07; 3.5 per cent in 2007/08
and 3.3 per cent in 2008/09. In absolute terms,
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however, the expenditure rose steadily, reaching
EGP36 billion in 2008/07.
The biggest item in the spending on education
was wages. These made up 82 per cent of the total
expenditure in pre-college education in 2006/07.
The remaining needs of the educational process
were clearly at a disadvantage. This prompted the
head of the NDP Education Committee to ask for
the allocations on education at 6–7 per cent of the
state’s budget for ten consecutive years. He also
advocated increased reliance on the private sector
in the financing and running of schools and
universities, as well as the enhancement of remote
teaching (Badrawi 2011).
The shortage of finance was particularly acute
considering the growing number of students. The
high number of students registered in college
education and government and private
institutions (2.4 million in universities, 130,076
in technical institutes during the year 2008/09)
meant that a growing number of graduates were
seeking jobs every year. The latter, as various
field studies and conference papers indicated,
voiced their dissatisfaction with the outcome of
the educational system. Dissatisfaction with the
quality of education was particularly acute in the
applied-science colleges, as the lack of
laboratories and equipment hindered scientific
training. Consequently, graduates found
themselves lacking the skills required by the
labour market. Shortages of foreign language
and computer skills were often cited in this
regard. The ratio of underqualified graduates,
according to some government studies, reached
27.3 per cent of the total (Egyptian Cabinet
IDSC 2011). This led to problems in getting jobs
and to a widespread feeling of frustration and
disillusion among the youth (ICFS 2006).
Among the youth of the underprivileged classes,
a growing feeling of alienation took root.
Enrolment in private universities – which
numbered 18 by the end of 2010 – or even
departments of foreign languages in some
colleges, such as those of economy and political
sciences, commerce and law,5 was out of reach for
the poor, and no financial programmes to help
top students of limited financial needs existed,
except in few universities and for a limited
number of students. The question of equal
opportunity and social justice was a serious one,
especially as some of these universities admitted
affluent applicants with little more than a scant
consideration for their academic aptitude.
The restrictions placed by the government and the
security apparatus on the freedom of students to
voice political views inside the universities were
considerable. Restrictions were placed on
membership in student unions and societies, and
even on guest speakers from the opposition. The
restrictions were such that the student bylaw for
1979, and its amendment by republican decree
No 340 for 2007, made the approval of such
activities subject to the consent of the security
services, thus fuelling resentment among the youth
of all political currents, with the notable exception
of NDP members. As of 2006, the Muslim
Brotherhood youth began forming parallel student
unions in some universities. These unions, known
as ‘The Free Student Unions’, were met with more
restrictions by the university administration and
security services. Consequently, several students
were expelled and others arrested. Frustration was
widespread among underprivileged, out-of-town
students of the political opposition, who were
denied places in university dormitories. Students
were not allowed places in dormitories unless they
were vetted first by the security services (Saber
2007). In other words, students who were poor and
from the opposition suffered from dual
discrimination: once because of their limited
means and again because of their political views.
3.2 Employment policies
According to official figures released by the
Central Organisation for Public Mobilisation and
Statistics in 2010, the rate of unemployment
among the youth was 20.4 per cent in the 18–29
age group. The ratio was higher for males with
college degrees than for holders of high school
diplomas and holders of technical education
diplomas, at 26.8 per cent, 19.3 per cent and
11.2 per cent, respectively. The ratio was
particularly high among females with technical
education diplomas, females with a college degree
and females with high school diplomas, at 56.1 per
cent, 55.1 per cent and 45.5 per cent, respectively.
The ratios were even higher in the survey of young
people conducted in 2009, which showed that
nearly 58.5 per cent of youths in the above age
group were unemployed; the ratio being 83 per
cent for females and 27 per cent for males.
In general, unemployment was higher among the
educated than among the less educated and
Wardany The Mubarak Regime’s Failed Youth Policies and the January Uprising40
among females than males, especially in the
post-high school category. The ratio went down
for both sexes after the age of 21, with greater
improvement among males. By age 29, males
seem to be able to find some form of
employment (Assaad 2010).
The problem of unemployment is associated with
many factors, chiefly the population increase, the
size of the workforce, and the inability of the
labour market to provide jobs for all graduates,
especially the less qualified. The privatisation
policies which the regime started in the early
1990s made unemployment worse as a result of
the laying off of excess labour (Dessouki and
Mamdouh 2000). Since the introduction of
economic reform policies in 1991, successive
governments have failed to find the right
‘technological option’ for the country. As foreign
and domestic companies were encouraged to
bring in the latest technologies in production,
the demand on labour dwindled.
In his electoral programme for 2005, President
Mubarak promised to create 4.5 million jobs
within six years. He also pledged to improve the
educational process in the aforementioned
manner and to stimulate demand in foreign
markets for ‘trained’ Egyptian labours but these
efforts brought no tangible results. Meanwhile,
the number of young people entering the labour
market for the first time kept going up, the
quality of education went down, and the needs of
the labour market remained incompatible with
the skills provided by the educational system.
There was also reluctance on the part of the
youth (86.3 per cent of males and 74.9 of
females) to venture into business. Most of the
youth thought the state and the decision-makers
were under obligation to provide them with
work. Adding to this problem were the multiple
impediments the youth faced when seeking loans
from the Social Development Fund (SDF). The
small- and medium-scale businesses, which the
loans were intended to stimulate, were meant to
provide 42 per cent of jobs in Egypt by 2020.
Since its foundation in 1991, the SDF provided
loans for small and micro-businesses, totalling
EGP10.86 billion. But the impact on the small
and micro projects dedicated to the youth was
meagre, partly because the law does not grant
youths a preferential interest rate in the same
manner it grants other disadvantaged groups,
such as the inhabitants of informal areas, people
most harmed by economic reform programmes,
single mothers and people with special needs. In
the case of the above groups, as well as of
companies that specialised in food security and
animal breeding projects, the interest rates were
1 per cent, 2 per cent and 3 per cent,
respectively. But for small projects for the youth,
the rate was 7 per cent or more (Al Ahram 2009).
The second problem is that many youths have
been unable to provide the collateral the SDF
requires for lending. A third problem is that a
major proportion of the youth failed to see the
point in starting a business and lack basic
business skills. A fourth problem is the common
fear of defaulting, and the common notion that
defaulters may face imprisonment. The SDF
general secretary repeatedly denied that action
leading to the imprisonment of defaulters had
been taken. But a large number of youths felt
that the state was ‘trying to exploit them to
obtain high interest on the loans it offers’.
Officials in charge of the programme often felt
that the youth lacked seriousness and were trying
to ‘con’ them. Another problem was the difficulty
of marketing the products produced in the new
start-ups by young people, which was perhaps due
to the competition posed by cheaper foreign
products. Also, the state departments which are
in charge of developing small projects seem to
have lacked a comprehensive vision. Most of the
time, they focused on industrial rather than
agricultural projects, although there is much
room for investment in land reclamation. In fact,
the country could have used a bank that
specialised in the finance of small projects,
similar to the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,
which is sometimes called the ‘Bank of the Poor’.
Some studies have been made in this regard but
none have been implemented (ICFS 2006). Aside
from the SDF, there are other government
departments which support the provision of loans
for youths to start small projects. Some banks
have also become involved. But none of these
efforts have been successful, partly because of
their lack of expertise in the field, their aversion
to risk and their exaggerated requirements for
guarantees. Remarkably, the electoral
programme of President Mubarak for 2005 called
on banks to form specialised branches for small
loans and urges the creation of a network of
institutions, including post offices, to handle such
loans. According to the programme, the portfolio
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of credit related to small projects must increase,
and the bank reserves linked to allocations of
small loans must be brought down. The
programme also urges the abrogating of excessive
guarantees. It calls for providing technical support
for the pre-production and post-production
services.6 None of the above recommendations
has gone into effect, and the problems facing the
youth seeking credit for their small and micro
projects remain considerable. On the upside,
lending for medium-scale industries has been
more successful.
The final years of the Mubarak era saw nepotism
and cronyism taking hold of the job market.
According to a survey of youths conducted in
2009, nearly 42 per cent of the young believed
that having wasta (connections) was crucial for
employment. The survey shows this feeling grows
with age, from 38.8 per cent among those aged
15–17, to 46.6 per cent among those aged 25–29.
The ratio is higher among low-income families
than middle-income ones – 46.6 per cent and
32.2 per cent, respectively. It is also higher
among graduates of post-high school institutions,
who feel marginalised by society.
A study about cultural modalities in Egypt
confirmed this trend. A study on the values of
probity, transparency, and corruption, which was
conducted by the Ministry of State for
Administrative Development in October 2009,
involved a survey of 2,000 people aged less than
35 years. It concluded that the youth were the
most outspoken about the increase of nepotism in
the period 2004–09. About 90.1 per cent in the
above age group, compared with 88.7 per cent and
80.2 per cent, in older age groups, complained of
nepotism. Nearly 90.7 per cent of the youth stated
that they needed wasta to get anything done.
Nearly 83.6 per cent of those interviewed said that
corruption was growing in Egypt and that the
group most at a disadvantage, after the
uneducated, was the youth, among whom 52.2 per
cent said they were left out. The youth is also the
second most mistreated people in society after the
poor, a view held by 39.8 per cent of the
interviewees (Zayed 2009).
Certain practices hampered equality in the job
market. One is that some employers favour
socially privileged candidates and the offspring
of existing employees. The suicide case of Abdel
Hamid Sheta, a graduate of the Faculty of
Economy and Political Science, illustrates this
situation. Deemed ‘socially unfit’, Sheta was
blocked from joining the diplomatic corps, and
consequently took his own life.7 The sons of the
policemen, military men and judges tend to get
appointed in the same jobs as their parents,
mostly because they have no trouble passing the
‘appearance test’.
The failure of youths to find a suitable job
(30 per cent males, 40 per cent females), is
compounded by other problems. One is the
difficulty of finding affordable housing. The
government has launched several projects to give
youths the chance to own housing units at
subsidised rates. A total of 235,000 housing units
were built during the period 2005–09, but the
prices of these units exceeded the means of
disadvantaged youths (Madbouly 2010).
As many young people tended to remain
unemployed for long stretches of time, they were
unable to get married. For women, the problem
of finding a husband got worse, as the average
age for marriage among men in 2009 reached
29 years, an age which is 3–4 years higher than
their view of the preferred age for marriage. And
the average age for marriage among females was
24 years, which is 2–3 years higher than the age
they deemed optimum. The high cost of
marriage was cited as a major reason for
postponing marriage (the view was shared by
61 per cent of males and 59 per cent of females).
The difficulty of finding an apartment was also
mentioned (by 52 per cent of males and 46 per
cent of females). Consequently, 38 per cent of
youths had to live with their parents after
marriage, and 34 per cent of young people ended
up marrying close relatives as families tended to
be more lenient about financial matters in such
situations (Sieverding and Elbadaw 2011).
4 The policies of political initiation and social
integration
What is meant here by political initiation is the
transfer of political culture from one generation to
another, which allows for this culture to experience
the alteration associated with modernisation and
changing circumstances. The aim of such initiation
is to preserve the identity of society and its social
and political stability. This is where Mubarak, his
government and the NDP have failed. They were
unable to inspire new generations and make them
sympathetic with the regime. They have also failed
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to allow alternative political institutions to grow.
This is due to the following factors.
First, the NDP and its government have failed to
create youth organisations similar to those
created by Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and
al-Sadat, such as the Liberation Youth
Battalions, the National Youth Federation and
the Socialist Youths Organisation, which
provided the main conduit for political initiation
for youth during the period 1963–76. The most
the NDP and its government managed to do was
to create generic youth gatherings that cannot
be properly described as youth organisations.
One example is the Horus Family, the Supreme
Council for Youth and Sports created in the
universities, following the African Olympics,
during 1991–6. Another is the Generation of the
Future Society, chaired by Gamal Mubarak. In its
early years, 1998–2002, the latter was used to
boost Gamal’s popularity and groom him for a
political role in the NDP. Training courses were
offered to members of that group at subsidised
prices, helping them to acquire basic aptitude in
foreign languages and computers, as well as
some management skills.
During Mubarak’s presidency, NDP leaders and
government officials spoke of supporting ‘all the
youths of Egypt without discrimination’ and
‘regardless of their partisan affiliations’. The
NDP called on the youth to participate in social
service, environmental campaigns and the
summer camps it organised regardless of their
political affiliation. And competent government
departments told the youth to take part in
summer and winter camps, maintaining that
these activities were open to all young people of
the various political parties, who wished to apply.
Second, the NDP was unable to attract youths who
believe in the party’s principles and ideas. The
NDP failed to create and train loyal political
cadres for a number of reasons. One is the
absence of a religious, ideological, political and
economic doctrine to entice the youth to join it
rather than sign up with other groups, such as the
religiously based Muslim Brotherhood, the
socialist and Marxist leftist parties, or even the
liberal parties including the Wafd, whose legacy
goes back to the pre-1952 era. Unlike the custom
in some Arab parties, such as the Syrian Baath,
the NDP and its government refrained from
hiring the young members of the ruling party in
the government apparatus. The only advantage
the youth gained from joining the NDP was
proximity to people with influence, which
potentially boosted their social standing among
their peers, especially if their personal ties with
public figures and executive officials proved useful
in resolving some problems among their
immediate families and friends. Being part of a
‘winning team’ was the main motivation for young
NDP members. Another was the subsidised
services offered by the NDP, which were
particularly attractive to disadvantaged young
people eager to join in summer camps. Access to
language and computer classes, and occasional
help with college-level classes was also a factor
(Mamdouh 2010). There was no clear plan to
train and engage NDP youths in the last five years
of Mubarak’s rule. This is evident in the
diminishing activities of the Training and Political
Indoctrination Secretariat and the infrequency of
training courses it offered, alone or in conjunction
with other NDP secretariats, such as those of
youth, information and organisation (NDP 2009).
Membership of the NDP, especially among the
youth, was mainly motivated by political gains
and the desire to have access to people with
power and influence. The spectacular failure of
the NDP to mobilise its young members during
the events of 25 January–11 February 2011,
prompted Policies Secretary Gamal Mubarak to
chide Organisation Secretary Ahmad Ezz: after
the fall of the regime, Gamal was quoted as
asking Ezz ‘Where are the Future Youths you
kept boasting about, and where is the self-
motivated young rank and file?’ (Al Ahram 2011).
Third, the government followed a traditional
system for political and cultural initiation which
focused mainly on filling youths’ time with social
and entertainment activities, with the latter
dominating activities in the youth camps. The
youth centres failed to engage the young in
political training and indoctrination. For
example, participation in the Youth and
Vanguard Parliamentarians in the youth centres
– which is the main programme for political
initiation in the Youth National Centres – was
remarkably low from January 2006 to January
2011.8
This was coupled with a failure to put together a
strategy to use the networks of youth centres.
There were 4,435 centres across the country in
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October 2011, but they were not used as a
political forum through which the youth could
engage, regardless of their political and
intellectual preferences. No political activities
were encouraged in youth centres, partly because
NDP members of the People’s Assembly, of the
Shura Council, and of local councils controlled
most of the boards running these centres, and
partly because the security services blocked
members of the opposition from getting elected
to these boards. Moreover, the Supreme Council
for Youths and Sports (SCYS) banned any
political activity in these centres during the
general elections, a decision meant to deprive
the candidates of the opposition and the Muslim
Brotherhood from using these centres. The ban
was not fully enforced in the case of NDP
candidates, who were allowed on occasion to use
the centres in campaign-related activities.
Another failing of the system of political
initiation has to do with the exclusion of the
youth of various parties and youth movements
from the national conferences organised by both
the Ministry of Youths and the SCYS.
Participation in the said conferences was limited
to individuals nominated by various universities
and governorates, i.e. mostly NDP members. No
effort was made to include the young ‘outsiders’
who were active on social networks, such as
Facebook and Twitter. In the SCYS
organisational structure, no job existed for
communicating with the youth using social
networks and no one seemed to be interested in
inviting the latter to various events.
Fourth, ministries and various government
departments failed to coordinate their
programmes for political initiation and
democracy training. This was partly due to the
lack of a central database listing the names of
potential participants. Also, the definition of
‘youth’ differed from one department to another.
This resulted in the duplication of the services
provided to the youth, and greatly limited the
number of beneficiaries from various state
programmes, who were a tiny fraction of Egypt’s
young population. Government departments also
failed to play a key role in enlightening the
youth. For instance, during 2001/02, the
country’s state-run television decreased the air
time for political programmes targeting the
youth while boosting entertainment to 30.5 per
cent of the total transmission hours (Kamal
2004). The total air time for youth programmes
in 2009/10, in all state-run television stations,
was 2,671 hours. Of these, 1,460 hours, or
54.6 per cent of the total, were dedicated to the
Family and Child Channel, a service known for
its focus on social entertainment (Ministry of
Information 2011). The lack of effective youth
policies and the absence of coordination between
the NDP and its government in areas related to
the political initiation and training of the youth
led to two things.
First, the youth became averse to participating in
political parties and social society organisations.
Membership of political parties amounted to
2.2 per cent of the social activities of young
people; for the 18–29 age group it is 0.12 per
cent. According to available figures, the
participation of youths in volunteer activities
averaged 3 per cent (4.5 per cent among males
and 1.5 per cent among females) (Barsoum et al.
2010). Among Egypt’s 35,000 NGOs in Egypt,
only a few are dedicated to youth-related
activities, and even those have a relatively low
membership. Reliable data on the effectiveness
of youth organisations is lacking. According to a
World Bank study released in May 2007, only
122 youth NGOs existed in Egypt (Al Rouby et al.
2007). Another study puts the figure at 310 youth
NGOs, including eight central societies that have
branches in the governorates (Kandeel 2007).
Second, the youth turned to other groups for
political learning and training. During
1981–2004 these groups included the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Gamaah Islamiya. Since
2004, new social movements began attracting the
youth, including Kifaya (Enough) and Shayfeencom
(‘We are Watching You’). Internet-based protest
movements such as the student-run ‘My Right
League’ (rabitat haqqi) became particularly active
in late 2007, speaking out, for instance, against
the increase of tuition fees in the colleges of
medicine and engineering in Ein Shams
University. The emergence of the April 6th group
in 2008 and the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ group
on Facebook in 2010 proved to be
groundbreaking. These groups offered new
channels for youth activities because of their
clear goals, proper understanding of youth
problems, and willingness to try new methods of
action, all of which contrasted with the
government’s outmoded ways.
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5 Conclusion
Mubarak’s regime has failed to deal with the
‘revolutionary’ youths and could not recognise
the new changes that globalisation have brought
about. Confining itself to a loose political
discourse about empowering the youth and about
giving them the chance for upward mobility, the
regime failed to offer any tangible work, either
materially or in cyberspace. It has failed to bank
on the sense of hope that evolved since 2005,
when the country’s first competitive presidential
elections led to greater freedom of expression, as
was seen in television chat shows, the independent
press and the social networks. This sense of hope
could have been used to ‘energise the youths’ and
‘revitalise the regime’, but instead it was wasted.
The above-mentioned issues were not, however,
the only ones that accelerated the uprising of the
youth and ultimately brought down the collapse
of the regime. Other issues were also involved,
such as the regime’s habit of going back and
forth between democracy and dictatorship. The
regime’s hybrid manners and inconsistent
approach allowed corruption and nepotism to
fester. As a result, the youth felt that their future
depended to a large extent on what kind of
connections they had with the government and
NDP officials. Considering that the legislative
elections were crudely rigged and that the state
institutions were not functioning efficiently, the
youth felt that the regime’s days were numbered.
The fate of the Egyptian youth will depend in the
future on many factors. Prominent among which,
is the degree of political commitment of the new
elected president and parliament towards
youths, as will be shown in the budget allocated
to their needs and ambitions and the issuing of a
nationally binding youth policy which will offer a
comprehensive framework to deal with youth in
Egypt. Without this commitment, the end of the
Mubarak regime will be only a historical moment
and a step forward towards a new kind of youth
marginalisation.
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Notes
1 It is worth mentioning that most of the
chairmen of the Higher Council for Youth and
Sport and Ministers of Youth had occupied
prominent positions in the NDP.
2 Remarks of Ministry of Youth and National
Council of Youth are drawn from the
researcher’s own professional work experience
in these bodies.
3 Interview with Dr Ali Al Dean Hillal
Dessouki, member of the NDP Bureau and
former Youth Minister, on 10 August 2011.
4 Annual Conference of Youth Researchers
(2004) Cairo: Center for the Study of
Developing Countries.
5 There are18 private universities in Egypt
according to the statistics of the Supreme
Council for Universities.
6 Mubarak’s Electoral Program: President
Program in Points, Cairo, August 2005.
7 There is much more news on the relation
between this incident and the eruption of the
January 25th uprising. For instance, see: Abd
Al Hameed Sheta, ‘Burned in Order We Win’,
Al Arabi Al Nassari newspaper, 15 February
2011.
8 Detailed information can be found within the
political empowerment sections of the annual
reports issued by the National Council of
Youth during the period 2006–10.
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